The Next War Won’t Be Fought With Weapons
It Will Be Fought Through Financial Systems
Table of Contents
Occupied by Morning
The finance minister's phone starts vibrating at 6:17 a.m. The first messages aren't from the front — they're from the central bank's operations floor. Overnight, an executive order and a coordinated European legal package have dropped on the country's financial arteries like a trapdoor. The nation's largest commercial bank has lost access to the dominant global payment messaging network. Reserves accumulated over a decade are frozen in the jurisdictions where they're most needed. Ships loaded with energy exports are still at sea, but the insurance and trade finance keeping those voyages commercially alive have become legally radioactive for any serious provider.
Importers are calling. Letters of credit are being torn up. A container of antibiotics is sitting offshore because nobody can guarantee payment in a currency the supplier will accept. No army has crossed the border. No missile has been fired. Yet by mid-morning, the country is occupied — not by soldiers, but by the quiet, jurisdictional authority of other states' financial systems.
This is the strategic reality that defense establishments are still reluctant to state plainly: modern conflict is no longer primarily military. The decisive engagements happen in sanctions registers, correspondent banking networks, maritime insurance pools, and the architecture of cross-border capital flows. The pipes that move money are the front line. And the states that control those pipes hold a form of coercive power that no tank battalion can easily replicate or dislodge.
The compliance manual is the new battle plan. Power, in this century, is denominated less in megatons than in SWIFT codes.
There's a phrase that captures this shift with unusual precision: "weaponized interdependence." Globalization built networks. Networks have hubs. Whoever controls the hubs controls the network — and can turn access itself into a weapon. The evidence of that logic playing out is no longer academic. The number of individuals and entities under international sanctions has grown dramatically in less than a decade. The reach of Western financial jurisdiction now extends to corners of global commerce that would have seemed implausible to policymakers in the 1990s.
The argument here is direct: the next major confrontation between states will not be settled primarily by force of arms. It will be settled by who controls the financial infrastructure — and who has built the resilience to survive being cut off from it.
When the Balance Sheet Becomes the Front Line
Soldiers are still dying in the field. That is not a detail to minimize. But the strategic logic governing how states contest power has shifted in ways that purely military analysis cannot capture. When an economy is deeply enmeshed in global networks — as nearly every serious state now is — the capacity to fund a war effort, settle transactions, insure exports, and defend a currency is not a support function. It is the war effort.
The older model of state power assumed that conquest required boots on ground, territory held, productive capacity seized or destroyed. Financial warfare starts from a different premise: that you can immobilize a modern state without crossing its border, by interrupting its access to the systems that allow it to function as an economy at all. Industrial-age wars were fought over geography and output. What's being contested now is permission — who is allowed to transact, who can borrow, whose ships can be insured, whose reserves can be spent.
That shift has made financial coercion attractive beyond the obvious political reasons. It can be deployed in days, by executive decision, without troop movements or casualty risk. It can be tightened or eased sector by sector with a calibration that air campaigns cannot approach. And it carries a built-in rhetorical cover: officials routinely describe measures that produce the practical effects of a siege as "targeted" or "non-kinetic." The U.S. Treasury is explicit that OFAC administers economic sanctions to advance national security and foreign policy goals. There is no pretense that this is incidental to statecraft. It is statecraft.
What has changed in the last decade is the maturity of the domain. Financial systems now have the structural features of a battlefield — chokepoints, contested nodes, rules of engagement, and a geography of relative advantage. Whoever controls the standards and gateways connecting to the world's dominant reserve currency and most credible legal systems can project coercive power at range and at pace.
Sever the financial lines and you achieve what an air campaign used to promise — operational shock, logistics disruption, a ceiling on what the adversary can sustain — without sending a single aircraft.
The Pipes — Infrastructure of Financial Warfare
The difficulty with financial warfare as a concept is that it sounds abstract until you map the actual infrastructure. That infrastructure is not markets — not the visible apparatus of trading floors and stock tickers. It is plumbing: unglamorous, largely invisible, and catastrophic to lose access to.
A sanctions designation converts legal authority into systemic denial. The private sector becomes the enforcement arm — banks cut off targets proactively. The system largely runs itself.
Over 11,500 institutions in 220 countries depend on SWIFT. Exclusion is like cutting a telephone exchange during crisis — then monopolizing the only satellite phone in the region.
The circulatory system of international commerce. When local banks lose access, their corporate clients export measurably less. It can be constricted without anyone declaring war.
~80% of world trade depends on trade finance. One P&I Club group covers ~90% of the world's ocean-going tonnage. Restrict access and you reshape what moves on the seas.
After Russia's 2022 invasion, $300–330 billion in sovereign assets were frozen overnight by legal instrument. Savings become hostages when reserves are held in adversaries' systems.
Sanctions Architecture
Sanctions architecture is the entry point, but it is frequently misunderstood. A sanctions designation is not, in the first instance, a punishment. It is a mechanism for converting legal authority into systemic denial. When OFAC lists an entity, the blast radius extends far beyond U.S. persons, because global banks, insurers, and financial intermediaries all require access to U.S.-linked clearing and counterparties. They cut off the target not because Washington orders them to, but because secondary exposure is existential. A single compliance failure can cost a European bank its U.S. dollar correspondent relationships — and with them, its ability to operate globally.
Payment Messaging (SWIFT)
Payment messaging is the second lever. SWIFT is commonly described as a payment system; it is more precisely the global messaging layer through which financial institutions exchange standardized cross-border payment instructions.
That scale is exactly what makes exclusion so disabling: the alternatives are slower, narrower, and more expensive. Removing a country from SWIFT is less like a sanction and more like cutting its telephone exchange during a crisis — then monopolizing the only satellite phone in the region.
Correspondent Banking
Correspondent banking is the layer most policymakers underestimate. Cross-border payments typically require a chain of trust — a bank in country A maintaining a settlement relationship with a bank that has direct access to the target currency. When those chains fray, trade frays with them. Research on episodes of severed correspondent relationships finds that when local banks lose access, their corporate clients export measurably less. Correspondent banking is the circulatory system of international commerce, and it can be constricted without anyone declaring war.
Trade Finance & Maritime Insurance
Roughly 80 percent of world trade depends on some form of trade finance — letters of credit, guarantees, short-term instruments that underwrite the risk of shipping goods before payment is confirmed. Remove those instruments and shipments stop, regardless of whether any physical barrier exists. Maritime insurance is even more concentrated: one international group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs provides liability cover for an estimated 90 percent of the world's ocean-going tonnage.
Reserve Assets
Reserve assets are the final, and arguably most consequential, piece of this architecture. After the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, somewhere between $300 and $330 billion in Russian sovereign assets held in Western jurisdictions were frozen. The precedent it established: reserves parked in other states' systems can be rendered operationally unavailable, overnight, by legal instrument rather than military action.
The real battlefield is not a border. It is the infrastructure that converts economic activity into state power — and the legal authority that can switch that infrastructure off.
Two Wars, One Lesson — Russia & Iran
The Russia and Iran cases are where theory becomes observable. They are not simply evidence that financial pressure works. They are evidence of how state power actually operates when the pretense that finance and force are separate domains is finally abandoned.
Russia's experience since February 2022 is the most comprehensive demonstration of financial warfare ever attempted against a major economy. Within days of the invasion, the United States prohibited transactions with Russia's sovereign financial institutions — including its central bank. European authorities followed, severing designated Russian banks from SWIFT. Within weeks, a decade of reserve accumulation had been rendered largely inert. The ruble collapsed. Procurement and import finance seized up.
The most operationally significant blockade of the Russia conflict was not naval. It was administered by underwriters, compliance departments, and trade finance desks. The G7-led oil price cap was built around service denial rather than physical interdiction: Western-linked maritime insurance, brokering, and financing became unavailable for Russian crude sold above the ceiling. The coalition didn't need to intercept tankers. It needed to make tankers commercially impossible to operate without its blessing. The weapon was a certificate of insurance and a payment guarantee.
Russia's response has been an instructive shadow war — shell company structures, flag-of-convenience changes, opaque insurers operating outside Western regulatory reach, vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers beyond surveillance range. The battlefield, at this granular level, is documentation: ownership chains, certificates of origin, service agreements. War, conducted at the level of administrative process.
Iran offers a complementary but distinct lesson — that financial warfare is not only a weapon against adversaries but a source of friction within alliances. When SWIFT disconnected sanctioned Iranian banks in 2012 following an EU Council decision, it demonstrated that nominally neutral infrastructure could be converted into a geopolitical instrument. When those sanctions were reimposed in 2018, targeting energy, shipping, and finance simultaneously, SWIFT again suspended Iranian bank access — and Europe responded by dusting off its blocking statute.
That European response is the tell. Even among allies, aggressive financial weaponization generates friction — because not all members of a coalition share identical vulnerabilities, and the logic of "neutral" infrastructure bending to American pressure is not a logic that European policymakers can afford to accept indefinitely. Three observations follow: financial dominance functions like air superiority, only cheaper and deniable; private intermediaries have been conscripted into enforcement roles they did not seek; and every exercise of this power accelerates the search for alternatives.
Why It Keeps Working
Financial warfare's rise as the preferred instrument of state coercion has structural advantages that conventional force cannot match, and those advantages compound over time.
Cost is the most obvious. Running a carrier strike group costs approximately $6.5 million per day. A sanctions designation costs legal drafting time and an interagency clearance process. The compliance infrastructure that enforces it — banks, insurers, correspondent networks — is privately funded and self-sustaining.
Scalability is the second advantage. Financial coercion can start as narrow as a single name on a list and expand, incrementally and without drama, to sectoral prohibitions, central bank restrictions, and comprehensive isolation. The EU's sanctions architecture is explicitly designed for this — an iterative system that can be tightened by committee decision without requiring legislative action or public debate at each step. Sanctions have ceased to be crisis measures. They are now standing doctrine.
The deterrence problem is the third advantage, and the least discussed. Conventional deterrence depends on the visibility and credibility of a threatened response. Financial coercion is chronically ambiguous in both timing and attribution. Measures that accumulate slowly — correspondent relationships quietly withdrawn, insurance quietly repriced, credit quietly unavailable — do not generate the clean escalatory ladder that nuclear or conventional deterrence theory assumes. Aggression laundered through compliance process is still aggression. It is just harder to respond to.
Then there is the political dimension. Military action, in democracies, requires public tolerance for casualties, legislative authorization, and sustained elite consensus. Financial coercion requires an executive decision and a press release. This is why financial warfare has become the default response to geopolitical crises across the political spectrum.
Most fundamentally, financial warfare attacks the right target. A modern state doesn't require territory to fight; it requires the capacity to pay, procure, insure, and stabilize. Cutting that capacity constrains what the adversary can do operationally. Economic endurance and operational endurance are not separable categories in a networked war. They are the same thing.
The weapon is not a bomb. It is access — and the authority to withdraw it.
The Counter-Architecture
No tool of state power goes unanswered indefinitely. The states being targeted by financial coercion are building around it, and the states watching from the sidelines are hedging against the possibility of being targeted next. The emerging counter-architecture is not yet a rival system. But it is evidence that the current order's dominance is being treated, by a growing number of governments, as a temporary condition rather than a permanent fact.
China's response has been the most systematic. The Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) was explicitly designed as alternative infrastructure for renminbi-denominated cross-border transactions. CIPS is not a SWIFT replacement — it lacks the depth, liquidity, and institutional trust that decades of dollar dominance have produced. But for states whose primary concern is survivability under sanctions, CIPS offers something SWIFT cannot: a rail that Washington cannot switch off.
Russia has been the most concentrated case study in what financial resilience doctrine looks like when written under fire. The Bank of Russia's financial market development program for 2026–2028 reads less like a development plan and more like a siege survival manual: expanding the domestic SPFS messaging system, deepening correspondent relationships with "non-unfriendly" jurisdictions, maintaining infrastructure for card payment systems outside Western networks. SPFS usage has grown measurably in the three years since comprehensive sanctions were imposed.
Reserve diversification is happening. IMF COFER data from late 2025 placed the dollar's share of official foreign exchange reserves at roughly 57 percent — still dominant, but lower than the historic norms of the 1990s and 2000s. Reserve managers are reducing the single-point exposure that makes a country's strategic buffer available to a foreign government's legal system.
Cross-border stablecoin flows peaked near $2.6 trillion in 2021 according to BIS research. Stablecoins don't yet meet the stability and integrity standards required to serve as the backbone of a national monetary system. But for circumventing specific chokepoints under specific pressures, they are functional. That is the bar that matters to a sanctions-targeted state's finance ministry at 6:17 a.m.
The EU's blocking statute prohibits European operators from complying with certain third-country sanctions on pain of EU legal liability. Its operational effectiveness is limited — but its existence reveals that financial weaponization generates friction even among partners. Everyone is watching how these tools get used. Everyone is updating their priors about whether their own assets might be next.
What the System Is Doing to Itself
The logic of financial warfare contains a self-undermining mechanism that its practitioners have largely chosen to ignore. The more aggressively these tools are used, the more rational it becomes for every other state — including states that are not adversaries — to invest in reducing their exposure to the system. And as that exposure declines, so does the coercive leverage.
Fragmentation is the first-order risk. The IMF has warned that geopolitically driven financial fragmentation can impair cross-border capital allocation and destabilize payment systems that the global economy depends on. What it describes, taken to its endpoint, is a world of parallel financial blocs — incompatible standards, duplicated infrastructure, sharply reduced interoperability. The efficiency that three decades of financial globalization produced would erode, slowly but irreversibly.
The trust problem runs deeper than efficiency. When institutions that were understood to be neutral — SWIFT, international insurance pools, correspondent banking networks — are revealed to be instruments of particular states' foreign policy, the trust on which their global utility depends begins to erode. Not quickly, not uniformly, but in the way that all institutional credibility erodes: through accumulation of evidence, reassessment by cautious actors, and quiet repositioning at the margins.
The costs are distributed asymmetrically. Smaller economies — those with the least geopolitical leverage and the fewest alternatives — bear the heaviest burden of de-risking. When international banks withdraw correspondent relationships from entire regions because the compliance calculus makes the business unprofitable, the result is financial stranding. UN analysis has documented this pattern across least-developed countries and small island states. The architecture of financial coercion is blunt. It does not carefully exempt the innocent.
Then there is the evasion dynamic. Every financial weapon teaches its targets — and observers — how to work around it. Shadow fleets, layered holding structures, jurisdiction shopping, and opaque insurance arrangements are not simply compliance failures. They are learned adaptations to a world in which the formal financial system is understood to be a weapon.
The strategic irony is uncomfortable: the more aggressively financial coercion is used, the more it incentivizes the construction of a world in which financial coercion is less effective. They can win engagements. Over time, they may be degrading the instrument with which those engagements are won.
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The New Map
Wars are still fought in the field. Artillery still decides outcomes in certain theaters, and the possibility of large-scale conventional or nuclear conflict has not receded. The geometry of military force has not dissolved.
What has changed is where the decisive engagements in great-power competition are increasingly happening. A missile can take out a bridge. A coordinated financial strike can make it impossible to insure the steel shipment needed to rebuild it. A tank column can seize a port. A sanctions package can make that port commercially inert by severing it from the credit, coverage, and payment infrastructure that make it a port rather than a pier. And a modern state cannot sustain territorial resistance after systemic financial isolation any more than it can fight without ammunition. The two dependencies have become structurally equivalent.
What is taking shape is a new grammar of power — one in which the geopolitical map is drawn less in borders and more in networks, and in which sovereignty means something different than it did when power was measured in divisions and warheads. The states that will define the coming security order are the ones that invest in financial resilience, reduce their single-point exposure to hostile infrastructure, build the legal and institutional capacity to both project and absorb financial coercion, and recognize early when the rules of the game have changed.
The states that treat financial infrastructure as background will discover their error in the same way the finance minister did. Not with a declaration of war. With a vibrating phone, and a cascade of messages that arrive before the shooting starts.
Control the pipes, and you do not need to cross the border. You are already inside.
Power has always been about controlling what others cannot do without. The currency of that control shifts across centuries — land, coal, oil, nuclear capability. In this one, it is financial infrastructure: the unsexy, indispensable architecture through which the modern state settles its accounts, pays its soldiers, and maintains its claim to sovereignty. Whoever can deny access to that architecture — and whoever has built enough redundancy to survive being denied access to it — will hold the kind of advantage that used to require a navy.
Key Takeaways
Financial systems — not armies — are the primary battlefield of modern great-power conflict. Sanctions, payment messaging exclusions, correspondent banking withdrawal, and reserve asset freezes can cripple a state faster than a conventional military campaign.
The private sector is the enforcement arm. Banks, insurers, and trade finance providers don't need to be ordered to comply — the threat of secondary sanctions and loss of dollar correspondent access is sufficient. The system largely runs itself.
SWIFT exclusion is not the whole weapon. It is one layer of a stack that includes reserve freezes, insurance denial, correspondent banking withdrawal, and trade finance collapse — all of which must work together to achieve operational effect.
Dollar dominance is the structural engine. The U.S. dollar appears on one side of roughly 89 percent of global foreign exchange transactions. That single fact is why American sanctions reach far beyond U.S. borders and compel compliance from institutions with no direct U.S. relationship.
Russia showed both the power and the limits. The 2022 sanctions were the most sweeping in modern history — and Russia still adapted through shadow fleets, yuan-denominated trade, and alternative payment rails. Sanctions constrain; they rarely collapse a determined state.
The counter-architecture is real. China's CIPS, Russia's SPFS, gradual reserve diversification, and crypto workarounds are evidence that targeted states are building redundancy. The direction of travel is toward a more fragmented financial world.
Financial weaponization is self-undermining over time. Every aggressive use of financial coercion accelerates the search for alternatives and erodes the network trust on which that coercion depends. The system that makes the weapon work is the same system being degraded by using it.
The next era of power will be defined by financial resilience as much as military capability. States that diversify reserve exposure, build redundant payment infrastructure, and develop legal capacity to resist extraterritorial reach will be strategically better positioned.
Frequently Asked Questions
It means the infrastructure that moves money — payment networks, correspondent banking chains, insurance pools, reserve custody systems — has become the primary terrain on which geopolitical competition is decided. Cutting a state off from these systems can immobilize its economy faster, more cheaply, and with less political cost than a military campaign. The "battlefield" is not a metaphor; it is a description of where states are actually winning and losing strategic contests.
Modern sanctions work through layered mechanisms that reinforce each other. Primary sanctions prohibit transactions for entities under the sanctioning state's jurisdiction. Secondary sanctions threaten foreign firms with loss of access to the U.S. financial system if they continue dealing with the target. Infrastructure restrictions — SWIFT exclusion, reserve freezes, insurance denial — then make normal commerce physically impossible regardless of what is technically legal. The compliance system is self-enforcing: banks and insurers cut off targets proactively to protect their own market access, without needing to be ordered.
No — and this is a common misconception. SWIFT is a messaging layer, not a transaction processor. Cutting a country from SWIFT disrupts standardized payment instructions but does not eliminate alternatives. The real devastation comes from the combination: SWIFT exclusion plus reserve asset freezes plus correspondent banking withdrawal plus insurance denial plus trade finance collapse. Each layer compounds the others. SWIFT disconnection alone is disruptive; SWIFT disconnection as part of a coordinated package is potentially crippling.
Because the U.S. dollar appears on one side of approximately 89 percent of all global foreign exchange transactions, almost every financial institution in the world requires access to dollar clearing to function. That dependency means the threat of being cut off from U.S.-linked correspondent banking — even for a foreign bank with no direct U.S. relationship — is sufficient to compel compliance with American sanctions. The mechanism is not legal authority per se; it is market access. No serious global bank can afford to choose a sanctioned target over the U.S. financial system.
The results were mixed but significant. The sanctions were the most comprehensive ever imposed against a major economy — locking down roughly $300–$330 billion in central bank reserves, excluding major banks from SWIFT, and disrupting energy trade through the oil price cap mechanism. Russia experienced genuine economic pressure: the ruble collapsed initially, procurement chains seized, and inflation surged. However, Russia adapted through shadow fleets, yuan-denominated commodity trade, expanded SPFS usage, and third-country intermediaries. The lesson: financial sanctions can constrain and raise costs substantially, but a determined state with significant resources and willing trade partners will find workarounds.
The G7 Oil Price Cap restricts the provision of Western-linked maritime services — insurance, brokering, financing — to shipments of Russian crude unless that crude is sold at or below a specified price ceiling. Because Russian exports depend heavily on Western insurance and logistics, the policy limits Russian energy revenue without requiring a physical embargo that would spike global oil prices. It weaponizes service provision rather than physical interdiction. The coalition didn't need to stop tankers; it needed to make tankers commercially inoperable without Western certificates.
Weaponized interdependence is the concept, developed by scholars Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, that globalization created networks with hubs — and that the actors dominating those hubs can convert connectivity into coercion by controlling or threatening to restrict access. Applied to finance: the U.S. dollar's central position in global clearing and trade settlement is a hub. States that depend on that hub — which is nearly all of them — are exposed to coercion from whoever controls access to it. The term captures why financial sanctions work even against countries that don't trade directly with the United States.
Yes, with varying degrees of seriousness. China's CIPS now connects thousands of institutions and is growing in volume. Russia has expanded SPFS and is actively shifting commodity settlements toward non-dollar currencies. Reserve managers globally are gradually diversifying out of the dollar, according to IMF COFER data. Stablecoins provide a parallel value-transfer channel at meaningful scale. None of these alternatives replace the Western system in depth or liquidity — but they provide survivability options for states facing exclusion, which is the bar that matters for financial resilience doctrine.
Smaller and poorer economies bear the heaviest unintended burden. When international banks de-risk by withdrawing correspondent banking relationships from entire regions — because compliance costs and sanctions exposure make the business unprofitable — economies that depend on those relationships for trade finance and cross-border payments become financially stranded. UN analysis has documented this pattern across least-developed countries and small island states. The architecture of financial coercion is blunt: it does not carefully exempt the innocent.
Financial resilience means reducing single-point exposure to financial infrastructure that could be weaponized by an adversary. In practice, it includes: holding reserve assets in multiple jurisdictions and currencies; maintaining functional alternative payment channels (CIPS, SPFS, bilateral currency swap lines); developing domestic capability for trade finance and insurance; building legal instruments to resist extraterritorial sanctions reach (like the EU blocking statute); and ensuring that critical imports can be settled in currencies not controlled by potential adversaries.
References
- [1] Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence," International Security, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2019.
- [2] LSEG, "Global Sanctions Trends: The GSI Report," 2024.
- [3] IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2023, Ch. 3: "Geopolitics and Financial Fragmentation."
- [4] IMF, Gita Gopinath, "Geopolitics and Its Impact on Global Trade and the Dollar," May 7, 2024.
- [5] IMF COFER Data Brief, December 19, 2025.
- [6] BIS Working Paper No. 1265, "DeFiying Gravity? Cross-Border Bitcoin, Ether and Stablecoin Flows," 2025.
- [7] BIS Annual Economic Report 2025, Ch. III: "The Next-Generation Monetary and Financial System."
- [8] UNCTAD, "Correspondent Banking Relationships and Trade," policy brief.
- [9] EBRD, "Broken Relationships: De-Risking by Correspondent Banks and International Trade," Working Paper No. 285, 2023.
- [10] World Bank, "Trade Finance: A Lifeline for Jobs and Businesses," 2025.
- [11] Brookings Institution, "What Is the Status of Russia's Frozen Sovereign Assets?" 2025.
- [12] U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC, Mission Statement. ofac.treasury.gov
- [13] U.S. Treasury, "Treasury Prohibits Transactions with Central Bank of Russia," February 28, 2022.
- [14] U.S. Treasury, "Fact Sheet: Limiting Kremlin Revenues and Stabilizing Global Energy Prices," December 2022.
- [15] Council of the European Union, "EU Bans Certain Russian Banks from SWIFT System," March 2, 2022.
- [16] EU Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2367 — oil price cap framework.
- [17] Council of the EU, "Council Sanctions 41 Vessels of the Russian Shadow Fleet," December 18, 2025.
- [18] OFAC, "Re-Imposition of Sanctions on Iran," November 2018.
- [19] European Commission, "Extraterritoriality (Blocking Statute)" — Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96.
- [20] Bank of Russia, "Russian Financial Market Development Programme for 2026–2028."
- [21] SWIFT, "Who We Are." swift.com
- [22] SWIFT, "Swift Instructed to Disconnect Sanctioned Iranian Banks," March 15, 2012.
- [23] International Group of P&I Clubs. igpandi.org
- [24] Reuters, "Factbox: Russia's $300 Billion in Reserves Frozen in the West," December 2023.
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